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Abstract. The password the almost universal authentication solution
yet is buckling under the strain. It demonstrates insufficiency and weak-
ness due to poor choice, reuse and ease of sharing Graphical passwords,
biometrics, and hardware tokens have been proposed as alternatives.
However, industry has not embraced these alternatives. One possible
explanation is the complexity of the choice process, i.e. for which situa-
tion and which person which alternative is most appropriate. To support
authentication decision-markers in this process we suggest a framework
called ACCESS (Authentication ChoiCE Support System) which cap-
tures situation and user related requirements, consults a knowledge base
of existing authentication mechanisms and their properties, and suggests
those mechanisms that match the specified requirements.
1 Introduction
The password can provide a high theoretical security, but the security level
in practice is compromised by password reuse, use of simple passwords, and
recording of passwords [1]. Strict rules for password creation cannot mitigate
against human frailty so it seems wise to consider more usable alternatives with
less cognitive load such as graphical passwords [2–4], biometrics [5–8], hardware
tokens [9], two/multi-factor authentication [10]. and single sign-on solutions such
as OpenID [11].
It is strange that passwords are still so ubiquitous in the light of this range
of viable alternatives. It seems to run counter to the natural order of things
for an inferior technology to prevail. On the other hand, this level of caution
is understandable since authentication is essentially a risk mitigation technique,
and organisations have to satisfy their auditors. Passwords are a well-established
technique with provable theoretical strength, while alternatives remain an un-
known quantity. A few papers have started to emerge [12, 13] which specifically
address the strengths of some of these alternatives, but these are unlikely to
make an impact on industry in their present format.
As things stand, developers and authentication decision makers are proba-
bly not convinced of the effectiveness of password alternatives as access control
mechanisms. The academic literature is most likely too obscure and unrealistic
to convince them. Successful use of alternatives by their contemporaries is likely
to carry more weight and might convince them [14, 15], but no one of a high
enough profile has, thus far, taken the plunge. One gets the sense that industry
is watching the effects of Apple’s recent use of fingerprint biometrics for their
iPhone 5S phone very carefully, and this might well be exactly what will make
the difference. However, biometrics, while undeniably useful for single owner
devices, is not going to be tenable in many a corporate setting.
It might be time for some kind of pro-active intervention, a way to support
decision-makers in selecting an appropriate authentication mechanism. The idea
would be make it easy for decision makers to access the facts about alternatives,
to find answers to their questions and to address their concerns. We propose a
framework called ACCESS (Authentication ChoiCE Support System) to cap-
ture requirement specifications from decision-makers, consult a knowledge base
of existing authentication mechanism properties, and suggest mechanisms that
meet the specified requirements both wrt. the concrete situation and user group
in mind.
Our first contribution is the description of this framework. Our second con-
tribution is to identify categories of requirements that will feed into ACCESS
based on a literature review in the areas of technology adoption and acceptance,
security, usable security, marketing and economics. To confirm these, we con-
ducted a survey with current developers in the field, i.e. target users of ACCESS,
to confirm our requirement categories.
As future work, the knowledge base will be created based on existing litera-
ture and, where necessary, additional investigations and evaluations of existing
proposals carried out to ensure that the knowledge-base supporting ACCESS
does indeed deliver value. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:
We first present our proposal for the ACCESS framework to support develop-
ers who are interested in considering alternative authentication. The following
section presents the results of our literature review: a set of requirements. We
then present, in Section 4, the results of an online survey we conducted with
developers. We then give an example of how ACCESS might be used before
concluding.
2 ACCESS Framework
ACCESS is a decision maker support framework, which encodes and encapsu-
lates a wide range of expert knowledge about authentication mechanisms. Such
frameworks have been proposed for use in a wide variety of areas [16–19]. and
follow three broad approaches [20]. The first is prior articlulation of preferences
where the decision maker provides a number of requirements, and the framework
then ranks the alternatives from its knowledge base in terms of expected utility.
The second is interactive articulation of preferences where the decision maker
interacts with the system, and is asked a number of questions in order to guide
the user towards one optimal solution. The third approach is the posterior artic-
Fig. 1. ACCESS Framework (option 1 according to [20]
ulation of preferences where the system generates a number of solutions without
inputs, and presents these to the decision maker who is then makes a choice.
For the design of the ACCESS framework it is important to known that there
is a clear difference between acceptance and adoption while the goal of ACCESS
is to adopt alternatives. Acceptance is a first step, which includes identifying
a technology (here an alternative authentication mechanism) that meets the
decision maker’s requirements. Then this technology needs to be piloted. If the
piloting is a success, the technology is deployed and carefully monitored to ensure
that it performs well. If it does, it might, over time, be adopted into full usage
by the company. Without the pilot, it is not even accepted, and since acceptance
is a necessary pre-requisite to adoption, no long term usage will ensue.
An overview of the proposed ACCESS framework is shown in Figure 1. The
decision maker provides information about the different requirements either at
the beginning or during the Feasibility Assessment. The feasibility assessment
tool uses the Knowledge Base, containing descriptive information about a range
of authentication mechanisms, to suggest a number of ranked alternatives for
consideration. The decision makers would choose one and conduct a pilot study
with some real users to determine whether the mechanism meets requirements
with the context of use. The pilot’s outcome is examined and a decision is made as
to whether to deploy the mechanism in the wild or to reject it. The performance
of the mechanism will have to be carefully monitored, producing data on the
usage experience and security incidents. Should these results show high levels of
security incidents or user dissatisfaction, the alternative authentication method
is rejected; otherwise, it is very likely to be adopted by the decision makers.
In order to provide an ACCESS tool for decision makers, it is necessary to
identify those types of requirements that are relevant in order to select appropri-
ate alternatives for specific situations, services, and users. Once these require-
ments are identified, the knowledge base can be constructed containing those
alternatives proposed in literature together with information about their prop-
erties with respect to the identified requirements. It is expected that current evi-
dence available in the literature might well not address all types of requirements.
Hence further studies and analyses will be needed to fill the gaps. Furthermore,
it will be necessary to dynamically and continuously keep the knowledge base
updated as new attacks emerge and new devices become popular. ACCESS can
thereby provide support for decision makers in identifying suitable alternative
authentication techniques.
3 Requirement Identification
We conducted a research literature review on adoption, acceptance, security,
and usable security, as well as business-related publications in order to identify
relevant requirements. We identified four categories of requirements: Risk Mit-
igation, Quality of Use, User Context, and Business Context. Their relation is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Users Authenticating
3.1 Risk Mitigation
Authentication is essentially risk mitigation. The value of the protected resource
should be matched with the strength of the authentication mechanism being used
to protect it. Correspondingly, the framework will need to determine whether the
security offered in practise by a particular authentication scheme matches the
value of the resource being protected and the assumed attacker capabilities. De
Angeli, Coventry, Johnson and Renaud outline in [21] the following dimensions
to assess the security of authentication mechanisms and could be used for judging
on the risk mitigation level:
Guessability: How easy it is to guess the secret. Note, no universally ac-
cepted security rating method currently exists. One measure that is commonly
used as a theoretical strength indicator is theoretical password space, which is a
measure of how many possible passwords (whether textual, graphical, or other)
exist given certain constraints on the makeup of the password. Since users tend
to choose simple passwords that do not take advantage of the entire possible
password space, the theoretical password space is a relatively weak measure of
offered security. Unfortunately, the results of previous user studies cannot be
used as a substitute for a universal strength measure either.
Observability: The ease with which the entry of the secret can be observed
(including shoulder surfing and malicious software on the corresponding device).
Recordability: The ability for an attacker to utilise a user-generated record-
ing, either of or associated with an authentication secret.
We propose to integrate these into the ACCESS framework. Furthermore,
the security of different password recovery mechanisms should be considered. All
these aspects are not proposed to be used quantitatively, but they do support a
comparison between different schemes, so that the best scheme for a particular
context, in terms of risk mitigation, can be identified.
3.2 Quality in Use
The traditional technology acceptance (TAM) model suggests that the most in-
fluential factors leading to adoption are perceived usefulness and perceived ease-
of-use, and these certainly confirm the importance of the usability aspect of this
requirement category. This is especially important when users are customers
rather than employees [22, 23]. Usability testing is routinely carried out during
software development [24]. An equally important aspect of quality in use, which
is not encapsulated within traditional usability, is convenience [25]. Users rou-
tinely choose based on convenience rather than strength [26, 27]. Moreover, we
now arguably inhabit a consumer-era where the real power of the market lies
with consumers, not with the service providers. An authentication mechanism
designed for the mainstream must match customer expectations and represent
a balance between costs and benefits to consumers. A number of aspects are
relevant to quality in use:
Memorability: The need to remember them is the password’s chief flaw.
Humans generate simple secrets to avoid forgetting [28], and this compromises
the mechanism’s theoretical strength.
Accessibility: Authentication should be accessible to most individuals, even
those with disabilities such as dyslexia, colour blindness or mobility issues so as
to ensure that the system meets the needs of the end-users [29]. For example,
an authentication mechanism reliant on sentences is not suitable if any of the
users are likely to be illiterate or to include a significant number of dyslexics. On
the other hand, if literacy is a given, and the target audience is elderly, then the
deployed authentication mechanism cannot reasonably rely on perfect memory.
Equipment: Some alternative authentication methods require extra hard-
ware, which may reduce the viability of the mechanism. If the target users are
employees, this aspect is easily controlled. If they are customers using their own
devices, expectations are far more constrained.
Convenience: The effort associated with authentication must be appro-
priate for the envisioned use. Three aspects [30] are relevant: (1) Enrolment
Time: Lengthy enrolment times could deter users but a lengthy enrolment phase
may be acceptable if it affords authentication secrets that are used rarely but
endure for years. (2) Authentication Time: Time-consuming authentication
could deter on-going use of an application or service. However, lengthy authen-
tication may be acceptable in high-risk situations or if it reduces inconvenience
in other areas, e.g. password reset. (3) Replacement Time: If employees are
locked out of their accounts, their inability to do their jobs costs the organisa-
tion money. If customers cannot log into a system, they cannot make a purchase.
Thus it is important for replacement to be given due consideration.
It is unlikely that the decision-maker will have a specific mandated time
span for these activities. What is reasonable though, is to encode the target
user group’s tolerance for delays in each of these areas. A simple scheme of
Low/Medium/High could suffice.
3.3 Business Context
The reality of the current world economy makes the business environment ex-
tremely competitive so businesses want to be sure that any new innovation is
going to benefit them ie. not lead to extra expense with no benefit to offset the
expense. This can be termed business value. In terms of switching to an alterna-
tive the benefit might be reduced calls to the help desk and increased customer
satisfaction. The fundamental monetary costs of an authentication approach can
be broadly classified into three types [28], as follows:
User cost: If the authentication approach relies on generic hardware and
software, e.g. traditional operation system and keyboards, then there are no real
costs for the user. However, if the authentication approach is token or biometric-
based then the cost of specialised hardware and software for each user would need
to be considered.
Infrastructure cost: The cost for the necessary infrastructure to operate
the authentication solution. The infrastructure costs for almost any authenti-
cation solution are likely to be high. However, the aim is that as more users
embrace a system or application, the infrastructure costs are reduced, as an in-
crease in users squeezes value from infrastructure.
Administration cost: The cost associated with the number of profession-
als required to manage bureaucracy and effectively operate an authentication
solution. This is likely to be directly proportional to the number of users.
It will be challenging to estimate some of these costs accurately so perhaps
a granular qualitative scheme should be adopted, which supports comparison
between different mechanisms but does not attempt to quantify the actual cost.
3.4 User Context
According to [30], context includes the following aspects which we propose to
use in ACCESS:
Anticipated Frequency of Use: A mechanism which is used infrequently
has greater memorability requirements.
Platform & Place: The envisioned device and/or software of an authen-
tication mechanism and the envisioned environments where an authentication
mechanism will be used. The modern mobile computer or smartphone has pushed
powerful computation and access to the Internet, onto many more devices. Hence
one cannot make any assumptions about platform or place of use.
Purpose: The reason for deploying an authentication mechanism. The mech-
anism may well serve one purpose in one setting but another, elsewhere. For
example, in one setting a person might authenticate to enforce accountability
but at other times to authorise purchases.
4 Developer Survey to Confirm Requirements
Having consulted the literature review to identify the requirements relevant to
decision making, we noticed that developers are, in general, rarely addressed in
the research literature on authentication and technology acceptance and adap-
tion. However, at the end the developers have to agree on new proposed au-
thentication mechanisms as well as being able to implement them and integrate
them in existing services and tools. Therefore, we decided to study the different
identified requirements further with an online survey with developers. The goal
of the survey was, on the one hand, to confirm that the identified requirements
were indeed relevant for developers. On the other hand, we wanted to determine
whether the list of requirements should be extended in terms of additional as-
pects. Furthermore, it allowed us to test further types of requirements namely
evidence and developer issues which were not mentioned in the authentication
literature we reviewed for Section 3 but are often mentioned in literature in
related areas.
We posted a link to an online survey on various developer forums. 93 devel-
opers responded to our survey, of whom 72% developed systems for the desktop,
2% developed for mobile environments only and the rest developed for both.
We asked whether they had had any experience of authentication other than
the password. 34% had had some experience of authentication other than the
password although 73% were aware that alternatives to passwords existed. 60%
said they were aware of situations where the password was not particularly suit-
able and 96% said they would consider using an alternative mechanism if it were
shown to be better for a particular user group. We asked them what would con-
vince them to switch to an alternative authentication mechanism. We offered
them the following possible reasons based on the literature reviewed in Section
3. They could select as many options as they wanted.
(1) risk mitigation: strength wrt. guessability, observability, recordability;
(2) quality in use: easier for users to use and remember;
(3) business context: it would reduce costs (either for user, infrastructure
or adminstration);
We did not specifically mention user context because we wanted to see
whether the developers mentioned this themselves as aspects of user context
are not that obvious and are not mentioned very often in literature. We included
’evidence: other companies have used it successfully’ although it has not
mentioned in the context of authentication literature we reviewed for Section
3, in order to confirm the importance of stories in convincing organisations to
use new technologies [14, 15]. We also included the option ’developer issues:
easy to use API’. This type of requirement was added as software engineering
researchers in general argue for the benefits of reusable components in software
development (see e.g. [31]). We also offered them a text field to add their own
reasons or thoughts, in order to get new types or aspects if there are any.
Fig. 3. Confirming Requirements
Figure 3 shows the result: User Context did indeed emerge from the devel-
opers’ comments. In general, all comments could be assigned to at least one of
the identified requirements. Sample comments are:
– Risk Mitigation: “It should resist observation attempts”
– Quality in Use: “Whether it was accessible to blind and deaf users”, “Ease
of authenticator replacement”
– Business Context: “It must hold value for the company and the end user”,
“It should not be too costly”
– User Context: “Whether it could be used on multiple platforms”
– Evidence: “Depends on how strong the evidence is”, “Ease of implementa-
tion”
5 Integration of Requirements into ACCESS
The developer survey led to the decision to include ‘evidence’ and ‘developer
issues’ in the ACCESS framework although it was not mentioned in the authen-
tication literature. ‘Developer issues’ is included in business context and evidence
is a different kind of element. Evidence encompasses ‘risk mitigation’, ‘quality of
use’, ‘business context’, and ‘user context’ aspects. While decision makers can
provide information about requirements in terms of risk, target end-users, busi-
ness and user context, they might only be willing to trial schemes supported by
hard evidence i.e. other organisations have used such a mechanism successfully
or the evidence from the academic literature is very convincing.
Fig. 4. Feasibility Factors Influ-
encing Acceptance and Adoption
of an Alternative Authentication
Mechanism
In Figure 4, the above-mentioned type
of requirements are incorporated into the
ACCESS framework. While ‘risk mitigation’,
‘quality of use’, ‘business context’, and ‘user
context’ are taken into account for the fea-
sibility analyses and to describe the authen-
tication alternatives in the knowledge base,
existence of evidence is a property of schemes
included in knowledge base and also added to
the output. However, it is not taken into ac-
count for the feasibility analysis as only very
few of the alternative authentication schemes
have been deployed and tested in the wild. If
ACCESS is successful this will change in fu-
ture and then ’evidence’ will become part of
the feasibility analysis.
In order to support this process and to
iteratively extend the framework based on
the results for piloting, it is essential for the
framework facilitate simple and easy record-
ing of pilot experiences. Such an interface
should record the experiences in terms of the
core requirements so that it can be matched
to scenarios presented by subsequent frame-
work users. If the framework is offered as a
web-based decision-support system, this information can immediately be made
available to other users. If it is offered as a stand-alone application, it should use
a push mechanism to send this knowledge to a central repository for broadcast
to other instances of the framework, as recommended by [32]. This will support
independent and distributed augmentation of the knowledge repository with au-
thentic and ecologically sound experiences from the field, creating a network of
mutually reinforcing systems [33].
Note, although quality of use is considered in the feasibility analyses, it is
necessary to run acceptance studies with the selected alternative afterwards. This
is caused by missing evidence from similar settings and the fact that the user
studies from literature considering to evaluate quality of use aspects are very
limited with respect to having studied a representative group of the population
and with respect to long term issues. All this can finally only be assessed in
use, in the wild, over time. For example, consider the following requirement
specification:
– Risk mitigation: Low risk: essentially a community website.
– Quality of use: Elderly community members, all literate, all with corrected
to normal vision, all with reasonable hearing, but with dexterity challenges.
Can use basic features on a computer. Convenience is not a concern for these
users.
– Business context: Small budget.
– Context of use: They will be using the mechanism from home and library
computers, but not from smartphones, or on the move. The purpose of
the authentication is to enforce accountability since members can post blog
items. There is no current website, and usage is expected to be bi-weekly
(fairly infrequent).
If we implement Korhonen et al.’s [20] first approach: eliciting requirements and
generating a ranked list of alternatives, the ACCESS framework might feasibly
generate the following ranking:
Musical Password [34]. This mechanism has been tested with a wide range
of users, and was very favourably received by the elderly participants. It requires
users to choose from a number of music clips, all of which feature 1960s music.
At authentication users identify “their” clips. In terms of memorability it per-
formed well across all user groups.
Recognition-Based Graphical Authentication [35]. This mechanism
was designed specifically for a user group as depicted in the scenario depicted
above. Users identify their own PIN, postal code and doodle from subsequent
challenge sets composed of image grids. It has proved extremely popular and has
been in use for 9 years now.
6 Conclusion
Alternative authentication technologies have not captured the minds and hearts
of developers, users, and decision makers. However, the pressures on the (tex-
tual) password have increased to such an extent that it is necessary for decision
makers to rethink this ’safe’ strategy and start thinking of other ways of con-
trolling access to their systems. We cannot realistically expect one alternative to
replace the ubiquitous (textual) password, but we propose to use a wider variety
of authentication mechanisms. To support decision makers to select appropri-
ate once, trial them, and subsequently to adopt them, we propose the ACCESS
framework. Future work will develop the the knowledge base and an interface
which captures the decision’s requirements and matches that to candidate au-
thentication mechanisms to support informed choice.
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